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Increasing dissatisfaction with the operations of present-day democracies has sparked a new 
interest in the operations of ancient ones, which in turn has raised questions about how and 
why classical Athens is venerated as a historical exemplar of good political practice. As some 
analysts contend that we are moving into an era of ‘post-democracy’, and the concepts and 
practices of democracy come under increased scrutiny and critique, democracy’s history is 
being mined for alternative practices and ideas that might deliver a better form of politics, 
both within and outside the academy.1 However, other commentators have criticised the turn 
to classical Greece as an exemplar, and its positioning at the beginning of the  history of 
democracy as constructing a narrative of European and North American exceptionalism that 
serves to exclude other historical traditions and political practices. Such critics contend that 
the valorisation of Athenian democratic practice can feed into a triumphalist account of 
Western exceptionalism; for Johanna Hanink, ‘the reputation that Athens enjoys today as the 
seedbed of liberal democracy is… largely an inheritance of Anglo-American Cold War 
propaganda’.2 Yet there is still the problem of accounting for what Josh Ober has identified 
 
1 C. Crouch, Post-Democracy (Cambridge, 2004), J. Brennan, Against Democracy 
(Princeton, 2016), H. Geiselberger (ed.), The Great Regression (Cambridge, 2017), with case 
studies on recent events in individual democracies. 
2 J. Hanink, The Classical Debt: Greek Antiquity in an Era of Austerity (Cambridge, 2017), p. 
24. See also J. Keane, The Life and Death of Democracy (London, 2009), pp. ix-xv; cf. 
Brennan, Against Democracy, pp. 6-8. J. Ober, The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece 
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as a conjunction of democracy and economic “efflorescence”, ‘a historically rare 
combination of economic, cultural and political conditions’, that now pertains across the 
contemporary developed world, but is rarely to be found in the societies of the distant past (p. 
294). 
Recent radical accounts of democracy’s history, such as those of John Keane and David 
Graeber, have, however, moved the focus away from Athenian democracy as a foundational 
moment. Keane took a wider, cross-cultural view, exploring the traditional of deliberative 
assemblies across ancient Near Eastern cultures and the mediaeval Islamic world, while 
Graeber explicitly rejected any appeal to classical Athens as a conservative trope that feeds 
into a ‘clash of civilisations’ model.3 Such comparativist approaches have challenged 
traditional linear narratives in which the Athenian tradition is the starting point; both 
Cartledge and Mitchell, in very different ways, seek to reassert the primacy of Athens in any 
attempt to write a history of democracy. 
New questions about the stability of democracy have also challenged established political 
teleologies, in which the democracy of the modern nation-state is the culmination of a 
developmental process. Our commitment to democracy as an ideology and a practice has 
been seen to waver. John Dunn, perhaps the most distinguished historian of democracy’s 
more recent history, warned of new threats to the legitimacy of established regimes in his 
Breaking Democracy’s Spell, while the presidential campaign and election of Donald Trump 
brought forth a flurry of commentary in which Plato’s account of democracy’s decline into 
tyranny (Republic books 8-9) was pressed into providing an analogy for the contemporary 
situation.4 In these circumstances there seems to be a need for a new history of democracy, 
 
(Princeton, 2015), p. 294 rejects the genealogical narrative of cultural exceptionalism and 
forges a different link between classical Greece and the modern developed world, with the 
conjunction of democracy and economic “efflorescence”, ‘a historically rare combination of 
economic, cultural and political conditions’ that now pertains across the contemporary 
developed world (p. 294).  
3 Keane, Life and Death, pp. 78-145; D. Graeber, The Democracy Project (London, 2013), 
pp. 170-3. 
4 J. Dunn, Breaking Democracy’s Spell (New Haven, 2014). For the use of Plato Republic 8-9 
as a critique of current US politics, see D.S. Allen, 'Donald Trump Is a Walking, Talking 
Example of the Tyrannical Soul', Washington Post (Post-Partisan Blog; Washington DC, 
2016), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2016/10/08/donald-trump-
is-a-walking-talking-example-of-the-tyrannical-soul/>, accessed 23/4/2017. For an 
exploration of the idea of political decline framed in terms of Athenian democracy and its 
critics, see R.N. Goldstein, 'Making Athens Great Again', The Atlantic (The Atlantic, April 
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one that accounts for challenges and failures within specific circumstances, rather than a 
triumphalist account oblivious to the cultural forces that have shaped its narrative. Activists 
campaigning for reform and change in political practice have adopted features of Athenian 
democracy as possible replacements for current processes – increased citizen participation in 
town-hall assemblies and other forums for deliberation and discussion, and the use of 
sortition (selection by lot) to create representative discussion groups or even to shadow or 
replace elected representatives in parliament – and their accounts draw on Athenian examples 
and histories. Such accounts are necessarily selective, and there must be a role for specialists 
in ancient history and politics to provide the contextualised detail to support the claims made 
for ancient political practice.  
Such is the motivation for Thomas Mitchell’s Democracy’s beginning: the Athenian story, 
inspired by the interest in ancient democracy shown by political scientists and theorists 
Mitchell met while an academic visitor at the Hoover Institution in the USA, and their need 
for a straightforward account of both the events and the people of the ancient world to 
support their own discussions and theorisation of the phenomenon of democracy (pp. 4-5). Its 
title also offers a firm riposte to accounts such as Keane’s, although he is not explicitly 
addressed, and the contemporary debate appears not to be within Mitchell’s sights. What 
Mitchell opposes is the earlier twentieth-century framing of democracy as minimal 
participation through election to the more extensive practice of Athens. As he notes, this 
narrow institutionalist perspective is a poor perspective from which to assess what constitutes 
democracy; ancient democracy lacks the processes by which modern democracies are 
identified, and would not count as a democracy for theorists for whom elections were the 
decisive identifying feature. As others (notably Roslyn Fuller, in her polemical plea for 
increased political participation) point out, the opposite is also true; ancient democrats would 
have regarded most parliamentary representative democracies as oligarchic rather than 
democratic, at best as a ‘mixed constitution’ in which democratic elements were balanced 
with aristocratic or monarchic elements, as Athenian enthusiasts claimed for Sparta, and 
Polybius for Rome.5  
 
2017, 2017),  <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/04/making-athens-great-
again/517791/>, accessed 23/4/2017. 
5 R. Fuller, Beasts and Gods: How Democracy Changed Its Meaning and Lost Its Purpose 
(London, 2015), pp. 122-7. 
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This introduction, along with a thoughtful epilogue, frames what is at heart a narrative 
enterprise. Mitchell aims to give ‘the full story of democracy’s beginning’, including the 
‘flaws that contributed to its eventual demise’ (p. 5). He therefore surveys the history of 
Athenian democracy from its archaic beginnings to a firm full stop with the Macedonian 
conquest of Athens; everything post-322 BCE is surveyed in his Epilogue. He ties the 
emergence of democracy to the development of the polis and its culture, although this was 
not universal across the Greek world. 
Mitchell’s framing of his analysis, outside of the introduction and epilogue, tends to be in 
terms of established debate and analysis from the Anglophone world, and he is more 
comfortable with older scholarship, with works by the venerated figures of Moses Finley, 
Geoffrey De Ste. Croix and Russell Meiggs featuring heavily in his endnotes. Compared with 
the Francophile Cartledge, Mitchell largely omits the work of the French historians of the 
‘Paris School’, whose structuralist and post-structuralist interpretations of Athenian history 
and culture have been one of the most notable strands in the development of ancient history 
in recent decades, beyond a brief nod in a note to Nicole Loraux’s account of the Athenian 
funeral speech (p. 316, n. 11).6 This leads to a rather positivist and proceduralist account of 
ancient democracy, and one untroubled by the challenges raised by John Keane, or those now 
levelled at classical scholarship by Hanink. It also delivers a history that aligns Athens with 
specific strands of modern political discourse, exemplifying Hanink’s concern that classical 
scholarship supports rather than questions political preconceptions.  
Mitchell’s analysis of Thucydides’ funeral speech (pp. 65-72) argues for the words attributed 
to Pericles as conveying ‘an ethos of liberalism’, providing the foundation for ‘a strong 
libertarian ethos’ in which citizens’ free speech and religious practice were unrestricted (he 
later argues that the execution of Socrates was politically motivated and ‘not a reliable 
gauge... of the level of freedom of speech and thought in fourth-century Athens’, p. 201). 
Athenian democracy, he claims, was based on negative not positive freedom, in Isaiah 
 
6 The current state of play in Francophone study of Athenian democracy, after the decisive 
developments of the Paris School, is summarised in a special issue of Annales, with Vincent 
Azoulay’s editorial providing a summary, and contributions by Paulin Ismard, Azoulay and 
others (V. Azoulay, 'Repolitiser La Cité Grecque, Trente Ans Après', Annales, 69/3 (2014), 
pp. 689-719, V. Azoulay, 'Repenser Le Politique En Grèce Ancienne', Annales, 69/3 (2014), 
pp. 605-26); both Azoulay’s and Ismard’s most recent books have been translated into 
English (V. Azoulay, Pericles of Athens, trans. J. Lloyd (Princeton, 2014), P. Ismard, 
Democracy’s Slaves: A Political History of Ancient Greece, trans. J.M. Todd (Cambridge, 
MA, 2017)). 
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Berlin’s typology; as his note acknowledges, this sets him against the established view of 
many previous historians of Athenian democracy (p. 316, n. 18). It also sits uneasily with 
Plato’s view that the ‘fatal flaw’ of democracy was its ‘concept of political equality’ (p. 102); 
while freedom is the more important concept for many US conservative thinkers, the ancient 
evidence, as Mitchell admits in describing it, is that equality was a primary concern for 
Athenian democracy’s founders and its fourth-century critics alike, and equality and freedom 
were both central to Greek conceptualisation of the relationship between citizens that 
characterised the polis. The relationship between ancient democracy and modern liberalism is 
one that has occasioned much debate, and may be best explored through examining the use of 
Athenian democracy by the architects of liberalism, briefly explored by Paul Cartledge in one 
of his final chapters. 
Such contextualist concern is dismissed by Mitchell. He suggests that scholars show too 
much concern with the risk of anachronism in dealing with Athenian political concepts and 
their relationship with current ones (p. 315, n. 5). But whether one thinks it important to 
distinguish between the polis and the nation state, between Athenian parrhesia and isegoria 
and modern freedom of speech, or to accord the Greeks a concept of property and personal 
rights, is, within the history of political thought, a choice governed by ideology as much as 
methodology.  
In contrast, Paul Cartledge’s Democracy: a life derives much of its strength from the 
contextualist and cultural historical scholarship that Mitchell downplays.7 This may be due to 
its origins as a lecture course, in which critical engagement with a range of current 
scholarship would naturally feature.8 Important works on Athenian history and culture, 
including the classic works invoked by Mitchell, frame many of his chapters, but Cartledge 
 
7 Cartledge dedicates his book to Josiah Ober, whose 1998 Political Dissent is a curious 
omission from Mitchell’s bibliography, and whose 2015 Seeley lectures in Cambridge, on 
Athenian democracy as a basic form of democracy in which tenets of liberalism are absent, 
provide a counter-point to Mitchell’s claim. 
8 I served as a teaching assistant on this paper, which was taken by finalists reading both 
Classics and History at the University of Cambridge. The two groups showed some 
difference in their choice of the essay topics: it was usually the modern historians who chose 
to write essays on modern democracy, often drawing on their previous study of revolutionary 
France and America; dealing with the vast chronological range, and the detailed knowledge 
of the political and intellectual history and intellectual culture of modern nations as well as 
Athens and Rome, challenged many students. 
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gives more weight to the structuralist and anthropological studies of French scholarship, 
typified by his use of Jean-Pierre Vernant’s work on Athens and its ‘intellectual revolution’.9  
The title of the lecture course on which it is based ‘Greek democracy and its legacies’, 
perhaps better conveys the scope of the work than its title. The prospectus for that course, 
included in Cartledge’s preface, clearly sets out its method as ‘explicitly and determinedly 
comparativist’ and its aim ‘to problematize and defamiliarize modern democracy’ and to 
‘sever any easy assimilation’ of it to any ancient version (p. xvi).  
The book title, on the other hand, makes a strong claim for the biographical metaphor, and 
also offers a riposte to Keane’s suggestion that democracy was facing ‘death’. Yet, just as 
with Keane’s work, which subsumes a tripartite typology of democracy (assembly, 
representative and monitory, the latter describing late twentieth-century democracy with its 
array of lobbying organisations, NGOs, media, and other groups mediating between citizens 
and government) into the biographical metaphor, this book’s structure and narrative 
demonstrate just how problematic this metaphor is. The fractured unity that Cartledge 
imposes on democracy’s history challenges even the model of a tragedy; there are lengthy 
intervals and significant changes of characters, scenery and location between some of the five 
acts into he divides his account, notably as the pace quickens for his final acts’ surveys of 
democracy in its post-antiquity decline and renewal. These gaps emphasise the lack of 
continuity between ancient and modern, and the problematic relationship between the two.  
Cartledge engages with the existing debate on this from the outset, mirroring the frame they 
provided for his lecture series; his Prologue sets out first his objections to the kinds of 
argument raised by Keane (pp. 2-3), and to Amartya Sen’s classic article, ‘Democracy as a 
Universal Value’ (pp.6-7), which argues for the relevance of democratic values across 
different cultures, and for the role of democratic politics in securing economic 
development.10 Here there seems to be a tension between acknowledging Sen’s case for the 
importance of asserting democracy’s cross-cultural relevance, and avoiding the construction 
of a model that asserts a timeless identity between democracy ancient and modern and draws 
a line from Athens to Washington DC. In a sense Cartledge’s argument is not that distant 
from the comparativist cases made by Keane and Sen, but in choosing classical Athens as his 
 
9 J.-P. Vernant, The Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca, NY, 1982).  
10 A. Sen, 'Democracy as a Universal Value', Journal of Democracy, 10/3 (1999), pp. 3-17. 
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exemplum Cartledge risks his comparativist account being mistaken for a traditional linear 
narrative of democracy’s development. 
In the book’s five ‘acts’, Cartledge both explores the development and flourishing of 
Athenian democracy (Acts I-III), and its legacy in later forms of democracy and the reception 
of Greek democracy within later political theory (IV-V). This comparativist approach enables 
classical Athenian democracy to be seen in the context of other, possibly earlier, Greek 
democracies, the residual and distinctive democracies of Hellenistic poleis, operating beneath 
the veneer of monarchies and empires, and the democratic features of the Roman republic. 
Both Mitchell and Cartledge follow Mogens Herman Hansen in identifying the mature 
fourth-century democracy with its complex procedures (for which we have much better 
evidence than the fifth-century democracy) as Athenian democracy at its most successful and 
interesting.11 In a sense they are also following the narrative of the Aristotelian Constitution 
of the Athenians, which ends with a survey of fourth-century Athenian institutions and 
practices, but Hansen and other modern scholars have unpicked details of continuing change 
within that century, difficult to discern from Aristotle’s account, and quite distinct from 
Aristotle’s more theoretical account of the development of democracy (Politics 4.4.1291b30-
1293a34). 
Cartledge final Act V provides a brief tour through the reinvention of democracy in 
modernity during the English Civil War, the French and American Revolutions, and the 
reforms of the United Kingdom in the long nineteenth century. Democracy, waking up from 
‘a long sleep’, is frequently invoked in political argument during this period, although rarely 
with any positive sense until Grote’s history and Mill’s political thought reintroduced a form 
of democracy as an ideal.12  Cartledge emphasises that the latter ‘unwittingly created what 
has been dubbed the “myth” of ancient Athens’ (p.303).  
 
11 M.H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, 
and Ideology (Bristol, 1999); on proceduralism and its performance in fourth-century 
democracy, see for example the processes for consulting the Delphic Oracle specified in the 
352/1 BCE ‘Sacred Orgas’ decree, IG II² 204, P.J. Rhodes and R. Osborne, Greek Historical 
Inscriptions: 404-323 BC (Oxford, 2003), p. 281. 
12 While Cartledge’s Act V works through four centuries of dynamic political change and 
theorisation in a little over 20 pages, James T Kloppenberg’s vast Toward Democracy offers 
a detailed account of democracy’s history from the opposite perspective, offering a brief 
overview of democracy’s ancient prehistory before beginning its main narrative with 
democratic ideas in the early North American colonies (J.T. Kloppenberg, Toward 
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Such mythologisation of Athens, in the classical scholarship of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and its consequences for the understanding of Greece in the modern world, are the 
focus of Johanna Hanink’s The Classical Debt: Greek Antiquity in an Era of Austerity. 
Hanink rightly perceives that mythologies created by earlier scholars, such as the art historian 
Johann Winckelmann, as well as the reception of antiquities such as the Parthenon marbles 
removed from their places of origin and feted in their new homes, have impeded 
understanding of the classical world by continuing to insist on the primacy of the imagined 
version, even though the cultural conditions under which that imagined version came into 
being no longer pertain. Winckelmann’s idealisation of the white marble statue has persisted 
as a cultural ideal, despite Winckelmann himself acknowledging the polychromy of ancient 
statues, and the wide dissemination of intensive modern scholarship on the subject (pp.107-
116).13 But Hanink also shows how the ancient Athenians successfully mythologised 
themselves, describing ‘How Athens built its brand’, and how this mythology itself is based 
on a sense of past greatness now subject to decline, fatefully colouring future perceptions of 
their culture (pp. 68-69). Although Hanink does not address the history of political thought 
directly here, her concerns about the continuing mythologisation of Athens and its impact on 
contemporary perception of Athens as an exemplum are a valuable guide for interpreting 
appeals to the Athenian past within this discipline, and indeed her Epilogue provides a set of 
classroom tools for educators to use in interrogating accounts of the Greek past (pp.272-8). 
While both Mitchell and Cartledge’s books emerge from their authors’ long careers in 
teaching ancient history, interest in Athenian democracy and its workings is far from being 
the preserve of professional classicists. A series of critiques of contemporary democracy, 
arising from other disciplines and from outside the academy, use Athenian democracy to 
contrast the failings of present-day practices. These works are more polemical in tone and 
intended to offer practical suggestions for political change; their focus is on practice and 
procedure as much as ideas and ideology. Roslyn Fuller’s Beasts and Gods asserts the 
discontinuity in the democratic tradition, firmly separating ancient and modern, direct and 
 
Democracy: The Struggle for Self-Rule in European and American Thought (New York, 
2016)). 
13 A recent Forbes column on polychromy by archaeologist and historian Sarah Bond 
attracted a negative response from critics invested in the whiteness of antiquity, which she 
analyses in ‘The Argument Made By The Absence: On Whiteness, Polychromy, And 
Diversity In Classics’, History from Below, 30/4/17, 
https://sarahemilybond.com/2017/04/30/the-argument-made-by-the-absence-on-whiteness-
polychromy-and-diversity-in-classics/. Accessed 17/05/17. 
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representative. Her view, that ancient thinkers would identify most contemporary 
democracies as oligarchies (pp. 23-25), has some support in the ancient evidence. Aristotle, 
for example, identified elections as naturally oligarchic, and the use of the lot to select 
citizens for offices to be the specific hallmark of a democracy (Politics 4.9.1294b7-9). 
Fuller’s vivid polemic identifies real issues, but her enthusiasm for Athenian practice 
occasionally skates over its difficulties, or makes unsupported claims for its achievements, 
suggesting that Greek science and philosophy is a product of Athenian democracy (p.22). But 
unlike the steadier work of Mitchell, and the more detailed account of Cartledge, this is not a 
historical account but a polemic. Fuller’s aim is to praise the ‘mad genius’ (p.35) of selection 
by lot and the randomness that it introduced, contrasting it with the outcome of elections, 
influenced by the money spent by candidates and their backers; wealth and oligarchy were 
inextricably linked (p.88). While Fuller’s Athens resembles the models that Cartledge and, to 
some extent, Mitchell, deconstruct, with her Athenocentric perspective on the Greek world, 
idealised versions of Athenian democracy have a distinguished history of their own in 
modern political thought, for example in Hannah Arendt’s model of the polis in The Human 
Condition.14   
Fuller argues that decisions made by a larger proportion of the electorate will be more 
acceptable to all than those taken by a tiny number of representatives. The divided response 
to both the 1975 and 2016 UK referendums on EU membership suggests that this may not be 
the case. The slender overall majority in 2016 barely masked greater regional divisions, and 
knowledge of these different results within the overall has threatened the cohesion of the 
political entity that is the United Kingdom. Fuller acknowledges that a member of the 
defeated minority ‘might not be happy’ (p.85) with a decision, but would accept it as that of 
the majority. Nicias’ acceptance of the Sicilian expedition vote might represent such a 
process, although Nicias himself had a complex role in the debate (Thucydides 6.8-26). 
Fuller’s work exemplifies a series of recent publications that explore the mechanisms of 
ancient democracy to criticise the ‘democratic deficit’ of representative systems and suggest 
alternative practices. Disillusion with the practices of mature representative democracies and 
the desire to explore different ways of instantiating democratic participation have driven 
scholars and activists from other disciplines to inspect classical Athens and its perceptibly 
 
14 H. Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, 1998), especially pp. 192-207. 
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different form of democracy. Public debate about what is and is not ‘democratic’ has often 
accompanied the analysis of outcomes of electoral processes, including the UK referendum 
on membership of the European Union, and the disjunct between the outcomes of the popular 
vote in the US presidential election and its electoral college. But exploring the details of the 
history of Athenian democracy reveals similar processes of challenge and change in 
democratic processes and the ability of citizens to access them.  
Two further books, David Van Reybrouck’s Against Elections and Brett Hennig’s The End of 
Politicians: time for a real democracy, both discuss the Athenian practice of sortition as an 
alternative to elections, a perspective that Fuller endorses. In all three cases, the authors must 
deal with the problem of negotiating the difference in scale between the participatory 
democracy of the ancient polis and the representative democracy of the large-scale nation 
state. 
Hennig suggests the use of large citizen panels, selected by ‘stratified random sampling’, to 
discuss issues and reach consensual decisions, a programme for which his Sortition 
Foundation campaigns15. Such panels could even form a national assembly of representatives, 
with the sampling weighted by age, gender and other criteria. Hennig discusses the problem 
of identity politics for democracy; sortition and mass participation could solve the difficulty 
of ensuring ‘descriptive representation’ of those with certain characteristics, particularly 
those who are underrepresented in current electoral systems (pp. 50-52). He concludes ‘It is 
time for ordinary people to deliberate together, with experts informing them and independent 
facilitators helping them to arrive at the moral crux of decisions’ (p. 196), but the history of 
democracy might suggest that all three of these groups and their interrelationship would not 
necessarily be neutral. Athenian democracy at its core relied on the possibility that the 
cultural homogeneity of its male citizenry, bound together by myths of autochthony and 
loyalty to the artificial tribes to which Cleisthenes had allocated their demes, could override 
the divisive class interests that otherwise might lead to faction and civil war. Some of the 
most powerful appeals in Greek rhetoric, from Pericles’ funeral speech to Themistocles’ 
appeal to the Greeks before Salamis, are to similarity and shared culture, suggesting an 
 
15 'What Is Sortition', Sortition Foundation, 
<http://www.sortitionfoundation.org/what_is_sortition>, accessed 25/04/2017. 
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awareness of the need to counter class divisions within the polis and rivalries between cities 
and regions. 
A further claim taken up by these works is the idea that technology provides a mechanism for 
re-instantiating the level of participation of an Athenian citizen in the context of a modern 
nation state. New communications technologies may offer a solution to the democratic deficit 
in societies larger than the Greek polis (Hennig, pp. 83-88). But if the experience of the 2016 
elections and referendum has any immediate lessons, it is that the relationship between 
technology and democracy is much more complicated and less innocent than idealists and 
cyber-utopians had envisaged. Suggesting that ‘digital democracy’ offers a ‘way forward’, as 
Fuller does at one point (p. 277), may be naïve in a context where persuasion and corruption 
through the circulation of fake news and manipulation of social media appears to have had a 
decisive effect on the public mood (elsewhere, Fuller acknowledges the problems of ensuring 
fair participation via technology; Hennig too is wary of the complex consequences of new 
forms of communication). Van Reybrouck offers a more detailed account of the problems of 
democratic information and knowledge in the context of new media technologies (pp. 41-54), 
along with a mixed proposal for both traditional democratic bodies and a chamber of citizens 
chosen by sortition to work together (pp. 150-58), a novel form of mixed constitution.  
But all of these optimistic visions are vulnerable to Thucydides’ and Plato’s critiques of 
democracy’s susceptibility to fraudulent rhetoric.  Ancient critiques of democracy, although 
their authors had plenty to say about the procedural failings of institutions, were often based 
on an assessment of its epistemic failings, such as Thucydides’ criticism of the Athenian 
decision to invade Sicily (Thucydides 2.65.11-12). Fundamental to Plato’s critique of 
Athenian democracy was his view that the Athenians were incapable of acting on or even 
possessing knowledge of the sort acquired by philosophers. The mass was inherently 
incapable of evaluating evidence or reaching a correct decision about it except when guided 
by severe constraints, and as his image of the Cave suggests, the information presented to the 
masses is a partial representation of reality rather than reality itself. Plato’s jaundiced view of 
democratic debate, and his view that elite speakers used rhetoric to mislead the gullible 
demos, was countered in antiquity by Aristotle’s ‘doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude’, or 
summation argument.16 When Thucydides problematizes truth in political discourse, in the 
 
16 T.N. Mitchell, Democracy’s Beginning: The Athenian Story (New Haven, 2015), pp. 102-
3; this argument has received extensive recent scrutiny, notably in D. Cammack, ‘Aristotle on 
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debate at Syracuse, Athenagoras’ claim (Thucydides 6.36-40) that the multitude are best at 
judging is in tension with his dismissal of Hermocrates’ (true) claim that the Athenian fleet is 
on its way. The role of knowledge has also been central to recent explorations of democratic 
deliberation and decision-making, whether assenting to a Habermasian model of discourse 
ethics and deliberative democracy or criticising it.17 
This problematisation of the role of knowledge and expertise within democracy perhaps 
offers a specific continuity between ancient and modern political theory; it is again a central 
concern of academic political theory, as both Mitchell and Cartledge acknowledge in their 
conclusions, following Josh Ober’s utilitarian claim for democracy’s capacity to deliver 
better government and enable innovation.18 Athenian participatory democracy has been recast 
as a precursor to Habermasian deliberative democracy, and with both Thucydides and 
Aristotle providing arguments for democratic deliberation enabling knowledge-based choices 
more effectively than other regimes, one might expect to see historians compare such claims 
with historical practice (as Thucydides himself does, as arguably he does not endorse 
Athenagoras’ claim, but narrates the Sicilian Expedition as a rebuttal of it).  
Moses Finley used Athenian democracy as an example that told against the post-war 
technocratic visions of minimal participatory democracy, but the case for democratic 
knowledge has a cynical counterpart.19 This debate has not been confined to the pages of 
academic political theory, but has been incorporated into political discourse, so that 
suggesting that someone is deploying ‘expertise’ has become a means of undermining the 
 
the Virtue of the Multitude’, Political Theory, 41/2 (2013), pp. 175-202 and M.S. Lane, 
‘Claims to Rule: The Case of the Multitude’, in M. Deslauriers and P. Destrée (edd.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 247-74; see below for 
the importance of this argument for theorists of deliberative democracy. 
17 E.g. G.M. Mara, The Civic Conversations of Thucydides and Plato: Classical Political 
Philosophy and the Limits of Democracy (Albany, 2008), pp. 87-142, cf. G.M. Mara, ‘After 
Virtue, Autonomy: Jurgen Habermas and Greek Political Theory’, Journal of Politics, 47/4 
(1985), pp. 1036-61. 
18 J. Ober, Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens 
(Princeton, NJ, 2008), pp. 12-22, Ober, The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece, p. 294; Ober 
uses the term ‘epistemic democracy’ to describe the possible processes of democracy, rather 
than its legitimation.  
19 M.I. Finley, Democracy Ancient and Modern (London, 1973), pp. 3-37. Two major 
explorations of epistemic democracy incorporate examples from classical Greek texts: D.M. 
Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton, N.J. ;Oxford, 2008), 
pp. 206-22, H. Landemore, Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective Intelligence, and the 
Rule of the Many (Princeton, 2013), pp. 53-64. 
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authority with which they speak. ‘Britain has had enough of experts,’ said Michael Gove in 
an interview just prior to the EU referendum in June 2016.20 Gove’s rejection of the role of 
expertise was anticipated by Jürgen Habermas in a collection of essays on problems of 
democracy, The Lure of Technocracy.21 Habermas was addressing the various financial crises 
of the Eurozone, and the conflict between political authority and the technical expertise of 
international institutions that this became, and identified rejection of technocracy as a 
problem for broad acceptance of the European project. But Plato’s depiction of Protagoras’ 
response to Socrates’ question on the teaching of virtue and political skill (Plato Protagoras 
319a-328d) provides an ancient analogy for this concern.22 
The uses for examples from classical Athenian democracy continue to develop, as the recent 
advocacy for sortition shows. While Fuller’s evocation of an idealised Athens draws on the 
cultural authority of classical Greece, she, like Hennig and Van Reybrouck, is more 
interested in the practices of direct democracy and its possibilities, than in the details of the 
Athenian tradition. The risk is that considering Athenian practice outside the careful 
contextualisation that Cartledge and Mitchell provide makes it impossible to evaluate the 
historical success of Athenian political procedures. The same holds true for the evaluation of 
Athenian political thought, such as the analysis of the problem of political knowledge and 
technical expertise provided by its contemporary critics; and, following Hanink, there is a 
need for an awareness of the way our reading of these sources has been shaped by the 
construction of classicism and Philhellenism. The extent to which Athenian practice and 
theory can provide informative analogies with contemporary situations and concerns may 
become more questionable when the context in which they developed is considered, although 
their perception of democracy as a fragile and contested phenomenon rather than the 
culmination of human progress has a new relevance. It may be that rather than framing our 
enquiry as the story of democracy’s beginning, or as a life, we may learn more from 
understanding the causes of its faltering in fourth-century Athens, its limitations in the 
Hellenistic world, and the constraints under which it was regenerated in its newer form in the 
modern world. Athenian democracy and its ancient theorists still have much to teach us.  
 
20 Henry Mance, ‘Britain has had enough of experts, says Gove’, Financial Times 3/6/2016. 
21 J. Habermas, The Lure of Technocracy, trans. C. Cronin (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 3-28. 
22 P.A. Cartledge, Democracy: A Life (Oxford, 2016), p. 96, Mitchell, Democracy’s 
Beginning, p. 64. 
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